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Abstract
The study inquired into why microfinance institutions (MFIs) collapsed in the
Ashanti Region of Ghana. The authors found that the problem related primarily to
unduly risky, unethical and illegal practices, mismanagement and disregard of due
diligence, which when convoluted by external factors like macroeconomic
instabilities and panic withdrawals, pushed the risk levels of MFIs beyond the point
of containment. We argue that the 2013 macroeconomic crisis in Ghana only
contributed to the huge number MFIs involved and the pervasiveness of the
collapse – the crisis was not a root cause.
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In response to rampant collapse and disappearance of MFIs or Susu 1 companies and
financial service providers (as they were then called), the Bank of Ghana moved in to close down
a number of such financial institutions countrywide in 2008 (Belnye, 2011). But the problem will
not go away only to rear its head since 2013 in a continual and more devastating manner. In the
first quarter of 2013, about thirty MFIs collapsed in Ghana due to an alleged inability to “sustain
their operations.”2 Later in the year, additional twenty also became insolvent3. The number keeps
on adding up. Recently, one MFI became bankrupt and swindled over 5000 clients4. Many of the
customers had saved up colossal sums with the MFI.
There is no deposit insurance in Ghana, therefore, when MFIs collapse, customers
irretrievably lose their working capital, savings and their sources of livelihood – their businesses
are likely to collapse, which further predisposes them to indebtedness and consequentially,
1

Susu is a local language which means deposits or savings.
MICROCAPITAL BRIEF: Thirty Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) Close in Ghana: http://www.microcapital.org/:
The customers, most of whom had huge deposits with those institutions could not get a refund for the owners could
either not be traced, or where they were traced, they failed to raise the requisite funds to pay the customers
3
http://thebftonline.com/content/bank-ghana-asked-toughen-microfinance-regulation
4
Lord Winners Microfinance swindles over 5,000 customers
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=299140
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impoverishment. In this way, instead of reducing poverty, microfinance could create additional
cohort of poor population. Further, the public needs to have confidence in financial institutions to
patronize their services; the collapse of MFIs is therefore a bad press for Ghana’s finance sector.
In a country whose microfinance penetration to the low-income population is as low as 9 percent5,
it is also detrimental for existing MFIs. Therefore, the urgency of the need to investigate why
commercial MFIs collapse in Ghana is extremely important in order to minimize the possibility of
repeating the same errors in the future.
This review also contributes to academic literature on MFIs collapse. Four collapsed MFIs
in the Ashanti Region were selected and studied. Additional information was gathered from the
Other Financial Institutions Supervision Department (OFISD) of the Bank of Ghana and the Ghana
Microfinance Institutions Network (GHAMFIN). The information gathered from the six
institutions through interviews and other medium and from the public, constituted the primary data
for the study. To enhance the comparability potential of the findings, secondary sources of
information on MFIs in Ghana and elsewhere were incorporated in the study. The study is
structured as follows: The next section presents the methodology of the study where we discuss
the tools, techniques and procedures employed in gathering the data for the study as well as the
challenges the study encountered and the limitations of the study. We present the findings in the
third section. In the final section, we discuss the implications of the findings for policy and
conclude the study afterwards.
Primary Data Collection
Initial interviews with Bank of Ghana (BoG) and the GHAMFIN staff
In Ghana, among other functions, the BoG has overall supervisory and regulatory authority
in all matters relating to banking and non-banking financial business including awarding license
of operation to all financial institutions6. In response to its widening supervision and monitoring
duties, in August 2013, the Bank established the Other Financial Institutions Supervision
Department (OFISD) to oversee rural banks, forex bureaus and MFIs. The OFISD was contacted
for the study obviously because of its role in the microfinance sector of Ghana as the regulator. In
the course of discussing the study with two researchers and field officers of the Department, some
others took interest in the subject and joined the discussion. Therefore, it eventually became a
spontaneous focus-group discussion with five staff of the Department. Some days later, the officer
of the Bank assigned to our study emailed us a written response to the questions in an interview
guide we sent them. The researchers later contacted them by phone to clarify grey issues7 that
emerged in our interviews with the former employees of the collapsed MFIs.
Of Ghana’s working-age population below the poverty line, only 9 percent have microloans (See
Schicks, 2011)
6
http://www.bog.gov.gh/
7
For instance, it emerged in the course of the interviews with the former employees of the defunct MFIs that the BoG
has introduced a biometric software, which helps to track and verify the borrowing history of clients to prevent
5
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In addition to the Bank of Ghana, the Ghana Microfinance Institutions Network
(GHAMFIN) was also contacted. The GHAMFIN is the umbrella network body for MFIs
operating in Ghana. It was formed in 1998 as a company limited by guarantee with the support of
the World Bank because of concerns of some Ghanaian MFIs for the development of best practices
in the delivery of microfinance services (GHAMFIN, 2014). The GHAMFIN seeks to promote the
growth and development of the microfinance industry in Ghana and present a common platform
for the Rural & Community Banks, Savings & Loans Companies, Credit Unions, Financial NGOs,
Microfinance Companies and Microinsurance companies and Susu Collectors. Like the OFISD,
we contacted GHAMFIN because they are also heavily involved in the microfinance sector of
Ghana. At the GHAMFIN, we interviewed Mr. Emmanuel Asante, the Finance & Accounts
Officer. Before coming to GHAMFIN, he was a manager of a MFI in Kumasi, the capital of
Ashanti Region and has been in the sector for more than 3 years, so he was very familiar with the
problem we were examining. We bought some of their published reports, which contained helpful
information but were not available anywhere online. Based on the information gathered from the
Bank of Ghana and the GHAMFIN, we adjusted the interview guide we had prepared for the
employees of the collapsed MFIs.
The accounts of the Bank of Ghana, the regulator and that of the GHAMFIN, the umbrella
network body for MFIs in Ghana, pointed to the Ashanti Region of Ghana, Kumasi (the capital)
in particular, as the hotbed of the problem of collapsing MFIs in Ghana. According to them, even
MFIs that collapse in other regions usually have their headquarters (mother branches) in the
Ashanti Region. The prevalence of the phenomena in the Region and the fact that most collapsed
MFIs in other Regions of Ghana usually have their mother branches in the Ashanti Region, may
mean that, information on collapsed institutions in the Region could offer a useful perspective for
understanding why MFIs collapse in other parts of the country. We therefore decided to
concentrate on the Ashanti Region in selecting collapsed MFIs for the study.
Selection of collapsed MFIs
Identifying the collapsed MFIs was as difficult as getting the former employees themselves
for the interviews. If there were official list of collapsed MFIs in Ghana, this task would have been
easier. It was part of our request to the Bank of Ghana and they agreed to email it with the response
to the interview questions. However, the mail we received did not contain that information so we
contacted them again to find out. The explanation given was that when the MFIs collapse, they do
not take steps to officially file for bankruptcy with the Bank, so there was not any such list. This
placed limitation on knowing the exact number and names of collapsed MFIs in the Region. For
example, all but one of the institutions studied in this work collapsed in 2014 but there is only one
reported case in the media of a collapsed MFI in 20148 and that MFI is not part of those studied
“double-dip” – clients interborrowing from MFIs. But the Bank of Ghana said that the software though helpful, did
not come from them.
8
Ghanaweb – 29 January 2014: Lord Winners Microfinance swindles over 5,000 customers
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=299140
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herein. This means that many MFIs, just like the ones studied in this work, have collapsed
unreported. Even when they are reported, except the case of Lord Winners Microfinance Company
and Westbanc Capital Group9, the names of the specific MFIs involved are not mentioned. For
instance, none of the several media reports on the fifty MFIs that collapsed in 2013 mentioned the
names of the specific MFIs involved.
As a result, we had to rely on the public to identify the collapsed MFIs. In our interaction
with the public, even though several MFIs have collapsed in the Region, seven names kept
recurring. After the collapse of the MFIs, customers who had their deposits with them had been
chasing the former staff for refund of their money. Therefore, the former employees of the
collapsed MFIs had become unwilling to open up to anybody on their former institutions,
suspecting that such people could be disguised customers searching for their whereabouts to
disgrace them. Getting access to them for interviews therefore was very difficult. The larger our
target respondents, the more energy and resources we had to spend in seeking to have access to
them. However, the possibility of losing them altogether was also becoming increasingly real. This
made the researchers to narrow the search to the ‘prominent’ seven. To win their trust, we
contacted people in their networks – close friends and relatives to lead us to them. After a long
period of bonding and persistent calls, out of the seven, we were able to access the four (4) profiled
below10. This means that the study did not cover all collapsed MFIs in the Ashanti Region – indeed,

9

Google Search of collapsed MFIs in Ghana returns the names of only Lord Winners Microfinance Company and
Westbanc Capital Group. The other reports are general and do not mention the specific names of the MFIs
involved.http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=299140
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=291198
10
Double Up Microfinance Company Limited began operation in 2009 with four customers and four staff. The
company grew phenomenally in a spate of 5 years. Before folding up in 2014, it had 15 branches, all located in the
Ashanti and Brong Ahafo Regions. Double Up’s crisis started in October\ November 2013. The representative of
Double Up interviewed for the study was a young HND in Accountancy holder from Sunyani Polytechnic who entered
microfinance in 2011 around October/November until 2014 when Double Up collapsed. He is now into hire purchase.
The interviewee started working with Double Up as Operations Manager, later as Credit Officer. He was then
promoted to a Branch Manager and later as Head of Operations and Internal Auditor.
Work Up Microfinance Company Limited also started operation in 2011 with four branches at Agona, Wiamoase,
Mankranso and Fade. In a matter of 4 years (2011-2014), the company grew from four to twenty-six branches. The
products of Work Up included Current Account, Savings Account, Susu Accounts (Anidaso Susu and Normal Susu)
and Investment Accounts (Work Up Trust and Work Up Gold) . It was a sole proprietorship company with limited
liabilities. The interviewee from Work Up as at the time the institution collapsed was a Branch Manager. He started
as a Marketing Officer in 2012, and later became a Marketing Manager at the Branch and Loans Recovery Manager
and promoted to an Accountant and later Operations Manager before becoming a Branch Manager.
Grow Rich Microfinance Company Limited was incorporated as a private limited liability company on July 21,
2010 under the Ghana Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179). Full operations started on 13th September, 2010 at Obuasi,
the head office with four (4) staff – the Manager, Operations Manager and two Client Relationship Officers. Grow
Rich collapsed in the year 2013. As at that time, the company had three (3) branches. The interviewee for this study
was working with the institution as a marketer. In their credit operations, Grow Rich focused on lending to very small
and medium-sized enterprises with the conviction that these businesses create the largest number of jobs and make
vital contributions to the economies in which they operate. The interviewee from Grow Rich is currently working with
a Susu and loans company and he interlaced his submissions with his new experiences – comparing his new place to
his former institution in explaining why it collapsed. However, he asked that his current institution’s name not be
disclosed because he did not have his superiors’ permission to divulge information about the institution.
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officially, the total number of collapsed MFIs in the Region is unknown. The four collapsed MFIs
were the only ones selected and studied because they were the only ones that granted access.
Interview with the former employees of the collapsed MFIs
The use of interviews was appropriate for the study for its nature demanded it to be situated
in the practical experiences of the stakeholders. As noted by Kvale et al, interview helps
researchers to elicit insights into the subjects lived world (Kvale et al, 2009). Thus, interviews help
to gather rich, deep and original information on the subject under investigation. During
interviewing, the interviewer could probe responses and this helps to elicit further information.
The interviews were one-to-one. Although there was a guide to help us focus on the relevant
questions, the exchange was conversational. The interviewees requested that their identities and
that of their institutions be kept confidential11. The names given to the collapsed MFIs are therefore
pseudonyms. The tape-recorded interviews were later transcribed with the aid of Express Scribe
Transcription Software. The transcripts of the five interviews, the focus group discussion with the
staff of the Bank of Ghana and the Bank’s written response to the interview guide we sent them
constituted the main primary data for the study. When the interview transcripts are quoted in the
analysis of the findings or anywhere as GHAMFIN (2015); BoG (2015); Dream Well (2015);
Grow Rich (2015); Work Up (2015) and Double Up (2015), the referred page numbers are the
ones in the transcripts.
Data collection problems and limitations of the study
Aside the challenges faced in accessing the respondents, there were other practical
challenges and limitations that are worth acknowledging. First, the study was such that it was
difficult to communicate its object to the former employees of the collapsed MFIs. It is naturally
uneasy to be seated and ‘drilled’ (so to speak) on how an enterprise you were part of demised. We
had to communicate the study to them in a more polite manner. However, this task worsened in
the course of the interviews when critically incisive and seemingly personal questions had to be
asked. We therefore felt smooth– talking them to be part of the study. The task of balancing our
quest for knowledge with our ethical need to be open, transparent and honest with the interviewees
was very uneasy.
Another challenge to this study is what constitutes a collapsed or bankrupt MFI. Whilst the
news about collapsed MFIs is public knowledge, there is no official document or record on them.
The reason as discussed elsewhere is that when the MFIs collapse, they do not take the legal steps
Dream Well Microfinance Company Limited – The Company was licensed by the Bank of Ghana and started to
operate on 2nd January, 2013 with 19 staff and one branch at Atonsu with a capital of hundred and twenty thousand
Ghana Cedis (GH 120, 000.00). The shareholders were the CEO and his wife. The man had 80% and the wife 20%
shares. Dream Well collapsed barely a year in business. Within 8 months of operation, the company established four
branches. The respondent from Dream Well interviewed for this study was the Human Resource Manager who doubled
as the Operations Manager. He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Publishing Studies.
11
As indicated elsewhere, after the collapse of their institutions, customers who had their deposits with them have
been chasing them for refund of their money. Hence, their unwillingness to open up to anybody on their former
institutions and the reason for their request that, their identities and that of their institutions not be disclosed.
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to file for bankruptcy with the Bank of Ghana. Therefore, the term collapsed or bankrupt MFI is
used in this study to loosely imply that the MFI is not operating anymore.
Finally, the findings of this study is consistent with the general causal factors of the collapse
of MFIs in Ghana noted by institutions like the Bank of Ghana, GHAMFIN, Ghana Association
of Microfinance Companies (GAMC) and other scholarly studies. While some level of
comparability cannot be denied, a small sample size of four collapsed MFIs in one region may
limit efforts at generalization. A larger sample may be needed for such purpose. The above
notwithstanding, the study offers an exploratory reference or benchmark for examining what drives
commercial MFIs into bankruptcy in Ghana.
Findings: Causes of MFIs collapse in the Ashanti Region
This section analyses the information gathered on the drivers of MFIs into bankruptcy in
the Ashanti Region of Ghana. The factors that caused the demise of the four MFIs studied were
similar. Therefore, instead of case-by-case analysis, we did a composite analysis of the four cases.
However, strikingly dissimilar factors and events are highlighted. The factors are grouped into
internal and external factors. The analysis was done by reflecting on the primary data in the light
of the literature on MFIs operations in Ghana as well as the broader literature on the collapse of
Table of Findings
Causes of MFIs collapse in the Ashanti Region
Cause of Collapse
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Double
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Dream
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Mismanagement
Violation of Bank of
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Macroeconomic
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Collapse Rumour



Source: Authors’ fieldwork.
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MFIs worldwide. In this way, whilst contextualizing the Ashanti case, we are still able to
understand it in reference to the larger discourse in Ghana and elsewhere. The section is subdivided into three sections: In the first sub-section, we present our table of findings depicting the
causes of the collapse of the MFIs studied and analyze them as internal and external causes
(factors) of the collapse in the second sub-section. In the final sub-section, we condense all the
factors (internal and external) into an explanatory framework of drivers of commercial MFIs into
bankruptcy in the Ashanti Region of Ghana.
As depicted in the table, similar factors accounted for the collapse of the four MFIs studied.
But while the causal factors were similar, the narratives on how they manifested varied from one
institution to the other. In the subsequent sub-section where we do a detailed analysis of them, we
refer to the interview transcripts for the rich details on how different events culminated into these
factors to cause the collapse of the MFIs.
Analysis of Findings
Internal factors
The internal factors relate to the operation strategies and managerial problems of the MFIs
that contributed to their collapse. We in seriatim analyze them under these headings: Indiscriminate
branching, offering of unsustainable returns/products to customers, disregard of due diligence,
mismanagement and violation of the Bank of Ghana’s rules and guidelines.
Internal factor 1: Indiscriminate branching. Microfinance supporters justify the
flogging of high interest rates by MFIs on grounds that they are more prone to risk – they do not
only have high operational cost, they also deal with the part of the population known to be highly
risky12. The problem however is that in spite of the already risky profile and high cost of operation
associated with microfinance, most MFIs rather pursue activities, which further increase cost
instead of keeping it under control. The most common of such practices in Ghana is branching.
As noted by Ayeh (2015), some MFIs have adopted physical branch establishment to expand
outreach and increase their share of the market. However, “unknown to them, opening branches
mean[s] more expenses on utility, salaries and other overhead expenses” (Owusu-Nuamah, 2014).
They wrongly perceive “visibility as viability” (BoG, 2015: 3).
Our findings collaborate the view that the phenomenon of branching is common among
MFIs in Ghana. Except Grow Rich, which maintained three branches for three years (2010 – 2013),
the branch expansion of the other collapsed MFIs was stratospheric. Within a short period of five
years (2009 – 2014), Double Up opened 15 branches, whilst Work Up grew from four (4) branches
to twenty-six branches in a matter of 4 years (2011-2014).
Dream Well survived for only eight months but managed to open four branches. The
interviewees confirmed that unbridled branching crucially contributed to the collapse of their
12

They contend that they deal with clients with low level of education; involved in enterprises that are risky; live
in areas that are known to have poor sanitation and therefore have high incidence of diseases; have no or little access
to health care facilities and do not have reliable income (see Rhyne, 2010; Rosenberg, Gonzalez & Narain, 2009). 6
The 2013 revised-Bank of Ghana rules say that MFIs with 1 – 5 branches shall attract an additional paid-up capital
of GH200, 000 for each branch
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former institutions. Of course, once MFIs are in competition with one another, proximity to
customers and visibility could be a competitive step to increasing outreach and market share.
However, unrestrained branching could have a toll on the company. First, opening additional
branches means additional cost and here not only in terms of among other things, new office
furnishes and staff, but also additional paid-up capital6. Second, it takes time for an MFI to become
financially viable so new branches certainly will in the short term experience loses – having too
many new branches will therefore translate into incurring even more additional cost and this was
true of the collapsed MFIs studied.
For instance, in the case of Dream Well, while their Atonsu head office was making
expenditure around seven thousand six hundred Ghana Cedis (GH7, 600) a month, the income was
only two to three thousand. The other branches too were making expenditures around GH 5000
and income around GH 1500 and GH 2000 (Dream Well, 2015). The benefits in opening new
branches, which includes geographical diversification of portfolios, and widening of deposits
therefore lost on them.
As observed by Ayeh (2015), the new capital investments in branching do not only add to
the cost profile but also compete with available funds for on-lending purposes. And since loans
and advances are the main sources of income for MFIs, growing more loses or not having the
needed funds to grow quality loans will mean that the company cannot generate enough income to
support its operations. How Dream well collapsed aptly reflects this: “Our main income was the
interest we charged on loans. It got to a time; we had no money to give out as loans because we
had invested them in creating branches” (Dream Well, 2015: 2).
Internal factor 2: Unsustainable returns to customers. This problem relates directly to
the increased number of MFIs sequel to the financial liberalization and commercialization of
microfinance in Ghana (Serrano & Sackey, 2015; Gallardo, 2001). Certainly, once many players
are in competition for a given market share, they are bound to work at outpacing one another. And
here, the eagerness to attract more customers and carve lion shares of an already saturated market
on the part of each MFI tended them to collectively roll-out products that will endear more clients
to them. However, the downside was that most of the products were unsustainable. As noted by
Owusu-Nuamah (2014), some of these products were too costly to the companies; their income
streams could not cover the expenses they were incurring in the form of interest paid to clients.
Whilst some MFIs were paying 30 to 35% interests on deposits (far in excess of the 24%
interest even the Government pays on treasury bills), others were tripling three months-deposits as
loans for customers. Some MFIs were also charging zero fees on deposits, while others shared
cloths and cement to customers for opening accounts with them. All the interviewees
independently confirmed that their institutions did one or more of those things to win customers.
The challenge they subsequently came to face was sustainability. The only investments known to
them 13 were treasury bills, real estate and buying fixed assets like lands, cars and of course,
13

Some of them did not even invest the money; they were lying idle. For instance the interviewee from Dream Well
said that they just sent their money to their mother bank, Fidelity Bank without investing it and were surviving on
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creating branches and since these kinds of investments were illiquid, they could not fall on them
when they became pressed. Moreover, the returns on the investments were not high enough for
them to be able to sustain the huge interests they were paying to customers. As the Work Up
interviewee admitted, “in the long run it became a virus because you will pay more interest” (Work
Up, 2015: 2).
The MFIs inability to continually triple deposits as loans and pay the huge interests
promised on deposits infuriated most customers who in turn in their numbers closed their accounts
with them. This together with other factors accounted for the collapse of Work Up and Dream
Well. However, as noted by Dupont (2005), financial institutions misfortunes could be contagious.
The repercussions of offering unsustainable packages do not run down only the vogue MFIs
offering them but could even transcend to others who may be giving reasonable interests. The
point here is that the different customers of the competing MFIs compare and share their
experiences with one another – they are friends, family members, they operate similar businesses,
so this is expected. Some customers upon hearing the gargantuan interests and mouth-watering
packages their friends were receiving felt short-changed, and therefore beseeched their MFIs for
similar packages with threats of moving their accounts from them. Double Up suffered this fate:
“You will see a MFI operating at high interest rates just to attract customers while charging low
interest on loans. In our case, our customers were complaining that other MFIs were giving high
interest so they moved their accounts from us to them the moment they heard, if I go there I will
get better packages. This really affected us” (Double Up, 2015: 3).
However, those MFIs whose customer base phenomenally increased because of this could
also not sustain the packages, so all the MFIs together lost the trust of the customers who were
already battered by economic hardships. This led to deposit losses and increment in withdrawals.
Internal factor 3: Disregard of due diligence. Commercialization has brought increased
competition for the business of low-income clients (Robinson, 2001) evidenced by the slew of
MFIs established worldwide. This has make abundant availability of ‘cheap’ credit to clients.
Increased competition among MFIs and clients’ unbridled access to a multitude of microfinance
providers as noted by Andersen (2009), remove the deterrence of strategic default that a
monopolistic MFI enjoys and cause decline in portfolio qualities. Insisting on due diligence which
generally is a bit time consuming then becomes disadvantageous to ethical MFIs for clients
disturbed or delayed by due diligent procedures could easily access loans from competitors without
or with little hassle. Borrowers could thus resort to “double-dip” and consequently become interindebted (over-indebted) to almost all operating MFIs by borrowing from one MFI to settle loans
contracted from the other and vice versa.
This phenomenon treaded through the interviews with the former employees of the
collapsed MFIs confirming an earlier finding of Grammling, (2009) and Kappel et al., (2010)
studies that over-indebtedness and “double dip” is common among microfinance clients in Ghana.
This is what the customers do as aptly described by the interviewee from Double Up:
only interest on loans and some other minor charges on book purchases like new passbooks and also minimum
balances.
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What happened is, ours, as we say, you will deposit and we will base on your
deposit give a loan. Since the customer wants the loan, he would be working with
a different MFI, and will be doing small small Susu [deposits] there, get about
five hundred over there, take a loan of thousand from there, come and deposit
that thousand with you, get about three thousand loan from you, go and deposit
it in a different bank and take about ten thousand loan from them (Double Up,
2015: 7).
Similar practices in Nicaragua led a kite-maker in Jalapa to accumulate a record debt of
$600,000 to 19 MFIs14. How this is able to happen is not magical. The competing MFIs have no
means of verifying the debt profiles of prospective clients from competitors and do not control the
loan disbursements of their competitors. Therefore, the clients are able to play them against one
another as noted in Andersen (2009).
Most MFIs in Ghana lost significant share of their operating capital through this. While the
problem reflects customers playing the competing MFIs against one another, materially, the root
cause is the MFIs own methods of recruiting clients. In Ghana, as noted in Owusu-Nuamah (2014),
the popular method of recruiting clients is this: The MFIs ask clients to contribute for a month or
two for them to double or triple their balances for them as loans. This downplays the significance
of proper assessment and monitoring of loans. Loan officer to client ratio surely would widen for
the package as it did was certainly going to endear more customers to the MFIs. The MFIs therefore
could not have enough time to look at loans that were defaulting because of the huge number of
clients involved and also because they were always busily serving incoming clients until the loans
hit the expiry region – by then, it becomes extremely difficult to recover. The clients identified
this loophole and played the companies by robbing Peter to pay Paul.
Internal factor 4: Mismanagement. Effective risk management is crucial to achieving
institutional self-sustainability in the microfinance sector9. However, among microfinance
practitioners, reckless expenditure, poor risk management and mitigation have been widely noted
(CSFI, 2008; 2009; 2010; 2012; 2014). The literature on the operations of MFIs have noted bad
managerial practices as one major cause of MFIs failures globally (Sinclair, 2012; Bateman, 2013;
2010; CSFI, 2008) and this is also true of the case in Ghana.
For instance, Grow Rich was disbursing loans to customers about whom they had measly
information and there was no requirement for a guarantor. Therefore, a significant number of their
The “no pago” (we won’t pay) crisis happened 2009/2010 in Nicaragua. The MFIs lent at high interest rates
indiscriminately to borrowers who also inter-borrowed. Borrowers were taking money from MFIs to settle loans
contracted from their competitors. This continued until the borrowers became incapable of paying back the loans. So
the borrowers collectively defaulted on their debts and the MFIs suffered a profound crisis. (See a detailed account
in Sinclair (2012) and also: https://nacla.org/news/no-pago-confrontsmicrofinance-nicaragua ) 9
The
commercialization of microfinance came along with competition for both funding and clients. To successfully operate
a MFI, inter alia, effective management of cost structures to ensure sufficient returns to pay for the more expensive
commercial funds is a prerequisite. MFIs operators must effectively manage risks and do cost control before they
could achieve institutional financial viability and self-sustainability. The rapidly expanding loan portfolios and
increased scope of operation of MFIs also substantially increase the risks in providing microfinance services. This
requires MFIs operators to be cautious and undertake economically sound ventures (see Andersen, 2009).
14
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customers bolted away with their money while some used loans from them to pay other loans
contracted from their competitors. The case of Work Up was terribly bad. Astonishingly, the
company was virtually dishing out money to any person who cared to apply for loan. The
interviewee from the institution thus submitted: “When you come to us, we were having money,
so we were not thinking about may be your guarantor, knowing your capacity that you can pay”
(Work Up, 2015: 1) and they shockingly had a “Credit Committee” superintending over this
practice! How do you give money out without thinking of the person’s capacity to repay? Clearly,
as noted in the industry’s 2012 report, “the flood of money pouring into the microfinance sector is
stirring up irrational exuberance and undermining discipline” (CSFI, 2012: 28).
Other profoundly bad managerial practices the study uncovered are poor risk management
and reckless expenditure, so by the time operationally relevant software like the one for clients’
debt history verification15 came, they (Dream Well and Double Up) were broke and could not
procure them. Instead of investing in current assets, they rather focused on fixed assets – buying
and furnishing big buildings for offices, buying cars, and other landed properties, forgetting that
the monies necessarily were not theirs but people’s deposits. A study conducted by the Ghana
Association of Microfinance Companies (GAMC) found that most MFIs operators fail to apply
financial intermediation principles.16
The other factors relate to blatantly poor clients’ recruitment strategies. One of the
interviewees submitted: “if we come to market ourselves to you and you say, oh go and come
tomorrow when you come tomorrow I will pay, we will make sure that we come tomorrow. We
were not thinking about how costly you are to us. We were thinking we like your money, your
GH2 Cedis. If we spend GH10 Cedis today on you, tomorrow we will get more than that” (Work
Up, 2015: 1). As if fortiori, spending huge resources to recruit clients’ flourishes their businesses
so they could pay off the investments sank into recruiting them.
Ludicrously, the MFIs owners’ were nonchalant to clearly imminent risks. As stated by the
interviewee from Work Up: “at the top management, sometimes you being on the ground, you will
see something and you would recommend something and they would say nothing will happen. But
you are on the ground. You will just report to them but they will sit there and watch it.” (Work Up,
2015: 2). We inquired further: “Is it not incredible that someone would put money in such a big
business, those on the field will raise issues and report to them and they will disregard it. What
was the motivation?” His response: “what they were very much interested [in] was the deposits –
the money [that was] coming in. They were so bold enough [to say] that nothing will happen. They
are too big to fail.” This finding collaborates that of Owusu-Nuamah (2014) that, one reason for
the collapse of MFIs in Ghana is that the owners do not heed to technical warnings and advice
from professionals.

15

The enormity of the problem of client inter/over borrowing from the MFIs has led to the introduction of a biometric
software, which reveals the debt history when the fingerprints of potential loan applicants are taken.
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Dream Well Microfinance Company deserves a special mention here for it had all the
trappings of a badly managed company. That, the company could collapse just eight months of
commencing business is enough testament to show how badly it was managed. Bemoaning on why
they collapsed, the former Human Resource and Operations Manager who himself holds a degree
in Publishing Studies stated that, from the top hierarchy to the last man at the bottom of
management, none of them had well-grounded experience in banking nor microfinance. They were
only receiving summary lectures from some consultants “once in a while”. He thus submitted:
In our case, you can’t find anyone who had worked with microfinance for long,
say 3 or 4 years nor any experienced banker manning the institution. We were
meeting these people once in a while and they gave us summary lectures for two
or three hours on how to operate an MFI. We only had 2 or 3 weeks training
which in my view was not enough. We had educated workers with HND as
minimum qualification but we all had no stint with banking nor microfinance
before coming to Dream Well (Dream Well, 2015: 2).
No wonder they could uncover the fraudulent deals some workers perpetrated against the
company only after collapsing. Related to this is what the interviewee from Double Up said that
in their case, they found a lot of endorsed withdrawals and loans authorized by some of their
managers who would not have endorsed them, had they the needed technical competence. As it
turned out, Double Up recruitment was not merit based but on familial relations, giving credence
to the Bank of Ghana’s claim that most MFIs do not employ qualified personnel to manage their
operations (BoG, 2015).
Generally, MFIs unlike established banks, the argument goes, are not manned by qualified
staff (CSFI, 2008; 2009; 2012). The observation is that this problem is however acute in Africa
and Sub Saharan Africa in particular, (CGAP & MIX, 2009) but also in other parts of the world –
where well-educated staff at middle management level is difficult to come by and vulnerable to
poaching from commercial banks (CSFI, 2009). As stated by one investment officer with the IFC
in South Africa, there are “not enough good managers in [the microfinance] market” (CSFI, 2008:
15). The case of Ghana is not different. The Bank of Ghana has consistently complained about the
competence of managers of MFIs in Ghana17. It is however profoundly ironic that after all the huge
financial resources trickling into microfinance, the sector would keep on having difficulties in
attracting and retaining talents.

Dr Yaw Gyima-Larbi, head of microfinance at the Bank of Ghana stated the pervasiveness of “liquidity crisesis in
Ghana is as a result of among other factors
“incompetent staff” managing MFIs:
http://www.microcapital.org/microcapital-brief-bank-of-ghanabog-to-raise-minimum-capital-requirements-formicrofinance-institutions-mfis-to-240k/ . This was reiterated in their written response to me. The GHAMFIN
representative also bemoaned on this in my interview with him. Employees of MFIs are mostly HND Holders and
Senior Secondary School leavers. It is costly for MFIs to hire degree holders but he noted also that increasing level of
unemployment has led to the entering of microfinance by degree holders, he said.
17
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Internal factor 5: Violation of Bank of Ghana rules and guidelines. In 2011, the Bank
of Ghana (BoG) undertook to bring MFIs under a uniform regulatory framework (revised in
2013) 18 by establishing a four-tier classification of MFIs and their respective registration
requirements as well as permissible activities. The guidelines also contain unambiguous rules, and
procedures for establishing a MFI, opening new branches, loan disbursement and deposit taking.
It clearly emerges that the collapse of MFIs in Ghana is also chiefly associated with violations of
the BoG rules. As argued by one of the BoG’s field officers, almost 85% of the collapsed MFIs
violated the law. This was collaborated by the interviewee from Double Up: “We the MFIs were
not following the regulations. That brought the collapse” (Double Up, 2015: 6). Here, we
demonstrate how the causes of the MFIs collapse were primarily violations of the BoG guidelines
by examining some of the causes of the collapse that were also violations of the Bank of Ghana’s
guidelines or rules and regulations.
First, in the case of Work Up, their major problem was unrestrained branching. As one of
their competitors stated in a conversation with us, it was imaginably impossible for Work Up to
do the kind of branch expansions they did without eating into the customers’ deposits. The former
Branch Manager of the institution would eventually confirm this when we interviewed him. We
inquired whether they also had problem with using depositors’ funds to establish branches and he
responded: “Yes, considering 26 branches in 4 years” (Work Up, 2015: 3). The company in
contravention of the BoG’s requirement of them to raise additional paid-up capital of GH 200, 000
for each new branch, rather used customers’ deposits to buy magnificent buildings as branch
offices. They instead of using their own capital used their liabilities. So when the panic about
collapsing MFIs in Kumasi engulfed the public, as the interviewee said himself, although they
were strong, once the depositors’ funds were not readily available for them to withdraw (because
they had been invested in creating branches), further weight was added to the speculation that they
were in fact crumbling. The company was certainly not going to survive when the customers
rushed to their different branches for their monies. Work Up was also giving huge loans which
were not only in excess of the margin their being a MFI allowed them to give, but also which in
the words of the former Branch Manager, were huge enough for even established commercial
banks like the Ghana Commercial Bank, United Bank of Africa and even Barclays to give to single
borrowers.
In respect of Grow Rich, among other factors, the company collapsed because they
disbursed loans to customers who owed other MFIs. In our conversation, the former Marketer of
the company said that Grow Rich was sandwiched by more than four MFIs. (Those MFIs were
operating before their Suame Branch –the name of the branch he was stationed was opened). At
the beginning of their operations, they poached some customers, registered them and took deposits
from them who also later came to them for loans. Apparently, most of these customers were already
doing business with their competitors and had taken loans, which were due for repayment.
18
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Therefore, Grow Rich’s proposal to give them loans when they deposit money with them was a
timely blessing.
The only way Grow Rich could have known this was if it had the biometric software that
helps to check potential loan applicants’ debt history with their competitors. But the software could
be used by only MFIs duly licensed to operate by the Bank of Ghana. However, as it turned out,
the company was operating illegally without license so they ended up giving other people’s
deposits (because that branch was opened with mainly depositors’ funds) to customers who owed
other MFIs only for some to default, others to delay repayment until a long time. They had
problems servicing the withdrawal demands of the customers of their earlier established branches
and collapsed eventually. Schicks prophecy that “if [clients] over-indebtedness were left to spread
[in Ghana], it would represent a serious risk on …. the financial sustainability of MFIs” (Schicks,
2011:1) could not have been fulfilled in any way better.
The case of Dream Well was not different from Work Up. They in contravention of the
BoG rules and guidelines used depositors’ funds to establish four branches in eight months.
Although the BoG rules state that “not more than 25% of initial paid-up or additional capital for
branches shall be spent on property, plant and equipment (capital expenditure)”19, Dream Well
was establishing branches at a cost equivalent to their total paid-up capital of hundred and twenty
thousand Ghana Cedis. Rather than sticking to the rule of not giving unsecured loans exceeding
5% of their paid-up capital, the company was giving colossal sums to the tune of twenty and thirty
thousand Ghana Cedis as loans, which were 24% and 36% of their stated capital, far in excess of
the allowed 5%. As the interviewee from the company cried albeit belatedly, “we thought that
would give us huge returns but repayment became problematic” (Dream Well, 2015: 2).
Finally, Double Up Microfinance Company just like the others, also honoured the BoG’s
rules mainly in the breach. The interviewee would thus yield when we pushed him on violating
the Bank’s rules and regulations:
Okay some of them [the problems] were managerial issues. We should have
known that our stated capital is this and do not give loans in excess of our stated
capital. And we were not following the BoG [Bank of Ghana] rules. They have
stated that we should not give a single customer more than 5% of our stated
capital. But we did. Our company did. Most of the companies too. Our stated
capital was hundred thousand that is one billion old Ghana Cedis but we were
giving a single client about GH10, 000, which is 10% of our stated capital
(Double Up, 2015: 3).
He would later complain that “as at now we have a customer who owes us about fifty
thousand [Ghana Cedis]. It could have taken care of about three branches. If during the crisis, we
had just 50% of that single customer’s loan, we could have been able to solve our problem”. So
we asked, “alternatively, had you not advanced that loan, you could have had the money to settle

19
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your problems” to which he responded “yes, but we overlooked the policy, the BoG rules and
regulations” (Double Up, 2015: 4).
Another major challenge Double Up had which relates to violation of the guidelines
pertained to deposits. The BoG rules explicitly state: “the amount of a deposit transaction,
including the balance on a deposit account at any time shall not exceed 5% of the institution’s
paid-up capital”. Stated differently, the MFIs shall not take deposits that are 5% in excess of their
stated capital. Yet, the company overlooked the guidelines and took deposits to the tune of eight,
twelve and fifteen thousand Ghana Cedis respectively, which were 10%, 14% and 18% of their
stated capital of one hundred and twenty thousand Ghana Cedis.
The reason the Bank of Ghana proscribes MFIs from taking huge deposits which are 5%
in excess of MFIs’ stated capital is to prevent a situation where they would not readily have money
to timely serve customers because a huge depositor made a big withdrawal. That was precisely
how the collapse of Double Up began. They experienced huge impromptu withdrawals by their
big depositors at some of their branches, which made them delay unduly, the withdrawal requests
of some of their customers since they had to call for cash from their mother bank, which also
delayed. Some customers who became frustrated after waiting for a long time left for their houses,
only for them to go and speculate to their friends that the company was collapsing for most people
could not get their money, as others had to wait for a very long time. So the next day, fueled by
some falsehood that the company was collapsing which was peddled by two bitter employees
dismissed for fraud, more than a double of the previous day’s number of customers beseeched the
MFI, demanding to withdraw their monies. And as the interviewee explained “because you have
made provisions not for the doubled number, you can’t satisfy the new batch, so they also [did]
spread the news, then the speculations continued and the panic too continued” (Double Up, 2015:
1). The radio stations picked it up, heightening the speculation, so people rushed to their different
branches to cash their monies. As the GHAMFIN interviewee submitted, “even [for] commercial
banks, Barclays or Stanbic Bank, if 50% of its customers jump into the bank and withdraw their
money, the bank would collapse” (GHAMFIN, 2015: 3). So, Double Up eventually collapsed.
The additional challenge to this problem of violation of the rules and guidelines on
microfinance is that the huge number of microfinance institutions affects the ability of the
oversight body– the Bank of Ghana– to efficiently regulate the sector.20 This explains why the
MFIs could break so many of the rules and operation guidelines in respect of for instance,
branching and operating without license, and why Ponzi schemes could survive for a long time
until customers are defrauded. The MFIs umbrella associations could have been useful in this
regard. However, as noted by the GHAMFIN interviewee, the absence of legal backing for the
umbrella associations to sanction limits their ability to effectively peer-regulate their members
alongside the Bank of Ghana.
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External factors
External factor 1: Macroeconomic instability. The aftermath of the global economic
crisis has led to the revision of the hitherto claim that MFIs operate in a market that depends more
on microeconomic conditions than macro fluctuations. MFIs as the narratives were, inhabit their
own business world 21 . Observers as well as practitioners have been rudely awakened to the
realization that after all, MFIs are not insulated from the shocks in the ‘real economy’ – there are
too many links through financial markets, credit conditions and the fortunes of their customers
(CGAP & MIX, 2009; CSFI, 2009; 2010). The “experience of 2009-10 has shown microfinance
to be a lot more susceptible to macro-economic shifts than previously thought” (CSFI, 2012: 38).
The operations of MFIs are thus subject to broader macroeconomic trends.
Collapsing MFIs or Susu companies and financial service providers, (as they were then
called), is not a recent development in Ghana. Belnye (2011) catalogues some instances of MFIs
collapse, which occurred as far back as 2008. That of 2013 became headline news because they
were not only widespread but also continual and the development is even yet to abate. The
widespread collapse of MFIs in Ghana since 2013 contemporaneously happened with a serious
economic crisis in Ghana for it to be sheer coincidence. It therefore was not surprising that
macroeconomic factors prominently featured among the interviewees as a major cause of the
collapse of their MFIs.
Ghana in 2013 tumbled – all the macroeconomic fundamentals plummeted. With an
election to win in the year before, the government commissioned a budget deficit of GH¢8.7 billion
($2billion) amounting to 12.0% of GDP and this would further cripple all the sectors of the
economy. Growth decelerated to 4.4%, considerably lower than the growth of 7.9% achieved in
2012 (AfDB, OECD, UNDP, 2014). The country’s currency, the Cedi depreciated throughout
2013, becoming West Africa’s worst performing currency according to Bloomberg22. Lending rate
hovered around 30%. In trying to reign in the fiscal deficit, the government imposed new taxes,
increased the thresholds of existing ones and increased utility tariffs, and petroleum prices. The
combined effect of all these were heightened economic hardship and increased cost of doing
business and borrowing which was further convoluted by energy crisis. The MFIs received their
fair share of the economic miasma.
Acknowledging the paths by which macroeconomic trends affect MFIs, the Microfinance
Banana Skins publications noted that it could be directly through interest rates, and general
business conditions and indirectly, through clients who have been hit by economic difficulty or
retreat from buying financial services (see CGAP & MIX, 2009; CSFI, 2009; 2010; 2014). Both

21

Marcelino San Miguel, president of Fundacion San Miguel Arcangel in the Dominican Republic, is quoted at page
30 of the 2008 Banana Skins Publication as saying: “In the medium and long terms, MFIs operate in a market that
depends more on microeconomic conditions than macro fluctuations, though macro trends affect everything ... But I
do not believe that this determines the survival and operational management of a successful MFI.”
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situations occurred simultaneously and contributed to the collapse of MFIs in Ghana. As submitted
by the GHAMFIN interviewee,
The economy did not help in the first place. The Cedi-Dollar issue. The whole
idea of investments - when Government was borrowing from the banks and the
MFIs were also borrowing from the banks. The Banks will give the money to the
government. Because the Treasury bill went up, the banks were not giving the
money to the MFIs again. The last 2013\2014, it was a huge issue. Microfinance
really suffered. Genuine people had their business collapsed. Not because they
were rogues. Some of them did not embezzle the money. Some have gone to
people as loans, some into real estates and it takes time to mature and the people
[customers], they need their money, they do not have time to wait. Had the MFIs
have support from the banks; they could have waited for the investments to
mature (GHAMFIN, 2015: 4).
Thus, not only did the continuous depreciation of the Cedi and high cost of lending crippled
the MFIs, but also the Government crowded them out of the lending market. Except the Grow Rich
interviewee, all the former employees of the collapsed MFIs said that their banks failed them when
they turned to them for help. The interviewee from Work Up lamented: “They failed us. We were
having a mother bank but they failed us. If they had supported us, but they failed us” (Work Up,
2015: 3). The former employee of Double Up shared similar sentiments: “In our case we did not
even wait for the crisis, we saw it coming, so we applied to one of our banks. They approved to
grant us the loan. We gave them the needed collateral and everything they wanted and even paid
the commitment fee. They later wrote to us that they are not ready to give us the loan” (Double
Up, 2015: 2).
Of course, lending to Government through lucrative treasury bills with ever skyrocketing
interest is more rewarding and less risky than to MFIs who are on the verge of collapse. In the heat
of the economic crisis, one surest way the MFIs could have sustained their operations was, they
like the commercial banks could have also invested the depositors’ money in the then lucrative
treasury bills. However, the little they had in their coffers after investing in creating branches did
not stay with them for long. The customers who were being battered by the economic hardships
were not making deposits again, they rather were withdrawing their savings to support family life.
The former Human Resource and Operations Manager of Dream Well thus stated: “People had
saved with us. But because of economic hardship, they were just making withdrawals” (Dream
Well, 2015: 3).
External factor 2: ‘Collapse rumours’ leading to panic withdrawals. When people
become concerned about risk to their savings, their first reaction generally is to withdraw their
money23. Panic withdrawal poignantly featured among the reasons stated by the interviewees as
the causes of the collapse of their former institutions. Sequence of events heightened rumours and
public speculation about the MFIs looming collapse, which then incited depositors to not only rush
23
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to withdraw their funds but also, discontinue making deposits. Whilst this experience was
commonly experienced by the collapsed MFIs, the underpinnings were different.
It is trite learning in banking that if individual depositors or investors become worried about
the health of financial institutions entrusted with their money, their attempts to protect their savings
by withdrawing them can force otherwise healthy institutions into liquidation, and so can spread
the impact of a shock to other institutions (Pettis, 2003; Dupont, 2005). Such cases lead to scramble
among investors and depositors to withdraw their money not only from the institutions at the center
of the crisis, but also from any institution caught up in the rumours. As argued by Dupont
“contagion can occur as bank depositors reassess the viability of other banks when they observe
either suspension or bank runs at a nearby bank. One failure, or the possibility of failure at one
institution, may be thought to reveal information about other potential failures even if no actual
link exists between the two institutions (Dupont, 2005: 416).
The manner in which Work Up Microfinance Company Limited collapsed falls on all fours
with the above explanation for how financial institutions or banks could collapse. The people of
Kumasi, the capital of the Ashanti Region considered Work Up and another MFI as the two biggest
and most ‘credible’ MFIs in the Region. One of their competitors said the two were seen as the
“mother MFIs in Kumasi”. Unfortunately, that MFI (name withheld) collapsed and this generated
rumours that, then Work Up also should be having solvency challenges. The former Branch
Manager thus submitted: “One thing is, last year for instance, a lot of MFIs faced crisis. We were
still standing but one MFI called [name withheld] collapsed. So when people got to know that [that
MFI] had been in crisis, people began to come out with a lot comments that our company too is
collapsing. Meanwhile it was strong…. they were just spreading it. Work Up is collapsing so if
you have money at Work Up, just go and withdraw your money” (Work Up, 2015: 2). Some
employees of the institution, seeing the increasing rate of withdrawals alerted their families and
friends who had deposits with the company to also rush and withdraw their money and this fasttracked the run on the institution.
In the case of Double Up, some bitter employees dismissed for fraud began peddling
falsehood that the company was collapsing. So the customers of that branch beseeched the
company to withdraw their deposits. Apparently as noted earlier, the company had experienced
huge impromptu withdrawals at a different branch that made them unable to timely honour the
withdrawal requests of some customers, so they told them to come the next day. This, the
interviewee said, gave credence to the dismissed employees’ false claim that the company was
collapsing in fact and occasioned panic withdrawals when some radio stations too picked up the
rumour. He thus submitted:
There were some staff among us who were caught manipulating the system and
causing fraud…. When they were arrested and granted bail, they started
spreading bad news about the company in the nearby villages that they were
working with the company and it’s collapsing so they should come and withdraw
their monies and that is when the panic withdrawals began. The radio stations
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picked it up and people thought we were collapsing and they all came for their
money (Double Up, 2015: 1).
The case of Grow Rich was also related to fraud. The company had some iterant bankers
(popularly called mobile bankers in Ghana) who went out to mobilize deposits from the customers.
But some of them under-reported the deposits on the mobilization forms they returned to the office,
even though they had correctly recorded them in the customers’ passbooks. For instance, a mobile
banker will take GH1, 000 from a customer and record the same in the customers’ passbook but
on the mobilization sheet that he is to send to the bank (office), he would underrecord it as GH500.
And the company was not doing regular internal auditing which could have helped them to detect
this in advance. Therefore, balance reconciliation disputations usually arose anytime the customers
went to the institution to do withdrawals or check their account balance. Grow Rich then paid for
this with its reputation for the customers went about telling others that “the institution is not
credible, they do not record properly when you make deposits” (Grow Rich, 2015: 4). Not only
did this lead to some customers closing their accounts with them, deposits too flaked.
In respect of Dream Well, upon seeing rampant withdrawals, the company decided to
control it by insisting that, for certain amounts, customers shall give them prior notice before they
come to withdraw. However, most customers neglected this, and when the company dishonoured
their cheques for failing to give them prior notice, they with fury ran to speculate that the MFI was
having liquidity crisis. This led to “panic withdrawal and it really caused us a lot”, the former HR
and Operations Manager stated (Dream Well, 2015: 3).
Pettis (2003) contends that in the world of finance, a collapse in institutional credibility is
highly disturbing for it can quickly lead to liquidity crisis. As noted earlier, when panic occasions,
it mostly begins to contagiously infect otherwise healthy institutions in a spreading and selfreinforcing wave of panic. Banking panics are self-perpetuating, and once public trust disappears,
it takes extraordinary and costly measures to defend the financial system. Pettis may not be far
from right for as the interviewee from Double Up stated,
For now, people in Ghana do not like microfinance especially in the Northern sector,
Ashanti and Brong Ahafo. Even up to now those [MFIs] operating in the northern sector,
here in the Ashanti region are suffering; they are still facing the panic withdrawal because
the people here have the negative impression that for MFIs, they will run away with your
money. So right now the deposits have reduced, they are only coming for withdrawals. I
have met a lot of my colleagues working in other companies, they are complaining. Still
they are sinking. They do not receive as much deposits as they used to (Double Up, 2015:
4 &6).
We did an anecdotal random sampling of people’s views on MFIs operations in Ghana and
the result was not different from what the interviewee stated. Some Ghanaians are of the view that
the MFIs are there for short-term purposes – to make money and diversify into other areas.
Therefore, once they mobilize enough funds from people, then they lock up their offices. Though
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quite cynical, this perception reflects the high public distrust and the fast ebbing public confidence
in MFIs, which has even been noted by the microfinance companies themselves24. This reinforces
Boateng & Boateng (2014) recent study finding that only few Ghanaians trust and have confidence
in MFIs, most do not. This rather unfortunate development bears watching!
Drivers of Commercial MFIs into bankruptcy in the Ashanti Region of Ghana
Below is a diagrammatic representation of the drivers of commercial MFIs into
bankruptcy teased out from our analysis of the findings of the study.

Figure 1: Drivers of Commercial MFIs into bankruptcy in the Ashanti Region of Ghana.
Source: Authors’ fieldwork.

As shown in the diagram, upon commercialization, many MFIs have entered Ghana’s
microfinance sector to compete for profit and ‘serve’ poor people. However, the desire to expand
outreach and increase market shares lead them to undertake suboptimal practices such as
indiscriminate branching, offering unsustainable returns to customers and disregard of due
diligence. Because of the increased number of MFIs, the BoG is not able to monitor, identify and
prevent in advance, illegal operations and unethical practices. Some MFIs are also badly managed
– the managers engage in unreasonably risky and improvident investments. Additionally, there is
a growing distrust for/waning public confidence in MFIs in Ghana (not just in the Ashanti Region
– see Boateng & Boateng (2014)). Ghanaians are increasingly becoming distrustful of MFIs so
they rush to withdraw their savings and discontinue transactions with them at the slightest hint of
solvency challenges – whether founded or unfounded. All these practices and factors coupled with
24
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macroeconomic factors (such as increased cost of living and doing business, Cedi depreciation,
spiralled inflation, decelerated growth, high lending rates) compositely heighten the already risky
profiles of the MFIs business of providing microfinance services, causing them to collapse.
Discussion and implications of findings for policy
First, the issue of MFIs managers breaking laws, disregarding due diligence, taking bad,
unethical and unduly risky decisions just to expand outreach and increase market shares fits into
the larger problem of “overtrading” identified among MFIs in Ghana. “Overtrading in MFIs occur
when they expand their operations too quickly or aggressively by opening up new branches in
hopes of increasing profits by expanding customer base and attracting more deposits” (Addo,
2014:4). Thus, confusing visibility with viability. The incidental problem is that the MFIs tend to
misapply capital when they open up new branches by diverting working (and mostly depositors’)
capital to complete. They as noted by Owusu-Nuamah (2014) therefore end up unable to meet
depositors’ withdrawal requirements timely, and on-demand because of insolvency. Such
situations create the attendant problems of panic withdrawals that may cause MFIs failure, as was
the case of the collapsed MFIs studied. Some studies (e.g., Nair & Fissha, 2010; Hayder, 2002;
Ghartey, 2007; Addo, 2014) have observed that a high percentage of MFIs in Ghana fail in the
first five years of operation, often as a result of overtrading and financial strain. This study firmly
collaborates that finding for none of the MFIs in this study survived beyond five years.
Related here are questionable managerial decisions including huge investments in
uneconomical ventures. Such practices mostly do not only beg due diligence, but also violate the
rules and guidelines of operations set by the BoG. What flows from this is that the MFIs depart
from their lanes, terms, and conditions of their license by giving loans and taking huge deposits in
excess of what the law allows them. At issue here are not just economically improvident decisions,
disregard of due diligence and/or violation of laws, but the MFIs essentially push into business
areas that they do not have the right skills and management tools for. But as Addo (2014) noted,
“the size of the sheep can never be equal to the size of the elephant even if it aims at multiplying
its size through overeating” (p.6). MFIs are never designed as commercial financial intermediaries,
so once they started behaving like commercial banks, it was only a matter of time for them to
collapse. As the interviewee from Work Up admitted, it was “like having bitten more than you
could chew, your jaws will pain” (Work Up, 2015: 2).
In the study, one thing was consistent and true of the collapse of all the MFIs – something
facilitated the collapse. The common factor was ‘collapse rumours’ leading to panic withdrawals.
One surest way by which any financial institution could collapse is if the agents collectively decide
to redeem their claims, all of a sudden, called panic withdrawal. However, people do not just panicwithdraw, something activates it.
As confirmed in this and other studies, there is growing public mistrust for MFIs in Ghana.
Therefore, the slightest suspicion lead customers to protect their savings by seeking to withdraw
them. And since the MFIs had used their deposits imprudently to create branches and buy illiquid
assets, they certainly were not going to be able to timely honour the numerous withdrawal requests,
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thereby leading to the fulfilment of the depositors’ belief that the MFIs were in fact collapsing.
Against this backdrop, whilst acknowledging the instrumental role the 2013 macroeconomic
instability played in the collapse of MFIs in Ghana, it appears to us and we contend accordingly
that, it only contributed to the huge number and the pervasiveness of the collapse – the
macroeconomic problems were necessarily not part of the root causes.
What then are the overall causal findings or answers to why MFIs collapse in the Ashanti
Region and probably Ghana? We take seriously the view that any attempt to explain organizational
failure will not be complete unless the interplay between contextual forces and organizational
dynamics are taken into account (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2010). However, sometimes, as noted by
Gillespie & Dietz (2009) and this is true of the findings of this study, the “locus of control for the
failure could be internal to the organization, even though the context for the failure may involve
external influences” (p.129). The key argument here is that failure is primarily caused by internal
factors even though, external threats may exacerbate it.
The MFIs against basic principles of financial intermediation, improvidently invested
depositors’ funds in creating branches, illiquid and other assets which were irrelevant to their
operations; they offered costly and unsustainable products; broke the rules and disregarded due
diligence practices, all in the name of increasing outreach and market shares. Certainly, they were
sowing the seeds of their own destruction by increasing the risk profiles of their already risky
business of providing microfinance services. This is in line with Gillespie & Dietz (2009)
observation that organization failure could result from “a single major incident, or cumulative
series of incidents, resulting from the action (or inaction) of organizational agent” (p. 128). Clearly,
the MFIs “shot themselves in the foot” as contended by Owusu-Nuamah (2014).
Nevertheless, as rigorously argued by Thomas Hobbes in his time-honoured theory of
Leviathan, if people on their own would do the right thing, then there will be no need for
institutions and laws. This issue even becomes more serious when raised in tandem with the critical
question of what happens to the depositors’ funds after the collapse of the MFIs25. The cost of the
collapse is disproportionally borne by the poor clients. Thus, the actual harm arising from the
25

Microfinance customers generally lose their savings when the MFIs collapse. The interviewees from Double Up,
Grow Rich and Dream Well said that they could not refund the customers monies to them. Even the few who were
fortunate could not get full refund because the companies did not have enough funds. In the case of Work Up, the
interviewee said some of the clients who had huge deposits took them to court and the court froze a few of their
movable assets but the value of the assets could not even defray the monies they owed them. So I asked, “What about
the petty traders who saved with you”? He answered: “They were all silent. They could not do anything”. What was
monumentally outrageous is that the owners of the MFIs went home with their assets unscathed, virtually – after losing
outrageous number of poor clients, their life savings. They still kept the assets – the buildings and premises used as
offices, the furniture, plants, cars, landed properties and most of the illiquid assets into which they invested the
customers’ funds. None of the former employees of the supposedly ‘bankrupt’ MFIs said their assets were liquidated.
E.g. The interview from Dream Well is now into hire purchase and he operates from one of the defunct company’s
offices in Adum, the central business district. Not only the assets, but also crucially, except Grow Rich, which was
operating illegally, all the other collapsed MFIs still have their operation licenses intact. As they stated, the Bank of
Ghana has not issued them “red card” yet. Therefore, when the dust settles, they are unhindered – they could easily
jump back into business again. The interviewee from Grow Rich even hinted that the directors of the defunct company
are now back in business with a different brand name. This raises a serious concern about the manner the Bank of
Ghana handles the issue of collapsed MFIs. Why must MFIs operators who could not refund poor clients savings that
they recklessly misapplied still retain their licenses and the assets of the companies deemed to have gone bankrupt?
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collapse is not borne by the operators of the MFIs rather, by the customers – the poor people and
the wider (microfinance) community. It seems the MFIs operators would not take their
responsibility to be prudent with people’s money seriously and would need to be whipped to
comply as urged by Hobbes.
The imposed duty is on the Bank of Ghana to regulate and protect the public from Ponzi
schemes, unscrupulous people and financial institutions as well as protect consumers and investors
funds from being (mis)applied by MFIs operators. However, as found in this study, the Bank has
an oversight challenge to constantly monitor and prevent illegal and unethical activities timely and
in advance. The question then is: What are the implications of the findings of this study for policy,
in dealing with the problem of collapsing MFIs and its attendant problems in Ghana, taken into
consideration the Bank of Ghana’s oversight challenges?
One thing we learnt from the former Marketer of the defunct Grow Rich Microfinance
Company who now works with a savings and loans company is that, knowing that, the Bank of
Ghana field monitors could come and check them impromptu, they are always careful to organize
their affairs. The Bank of Ghana may therefore consider creating in the other regions of Ghana,
subsidiaries of the OFISD, which is now centralised in only Accra to enhance nationwide
monitoring. Relatedly, devolution of sanction powers to the (umbrella) associations of the MFIs
who generally have offices and personnel scattered around the country compared to the Bank of
Ghana may be helpful. With such powers, the MFIs associations could peer-regulate alongside the
Bank and this would further enhance knowledge sharing and (peer) learning of best practices.
Second, the Bank and the Ministry of Finance financial literacy campaign must be
intensified and not only in the urban towns but also the rural areas where the people who generally
because of their level of literacy and location, easily become targets of unscrupulous people and
Ponzi schemes.
Third, the current (inverse burden) state of affairs where poor customers irretrievably lose
their savings but owners of MFIs deemed collapsed still retain the assets of the defunct companies
is grossly inequitable. Why should customers who had no hands in the collapse of the MFIs lose
their savings only for the owners to go home with booties? Of course, the public has to be as
vigilante as poor customers could come together for mass action against MFIs. Nevertheless, the
imposed duty is on the Bank of Ghana to follow every report and rumour on collapsed MFIs –
whether licensed or unlicensed, audit them and liquidate their assets to pay off depositors just as
they have announced to do in the recent case of DKM Microfinance Company26.
Fourth, criminal prosecution of MFI operators who recklessly play with poor people’s
money must begin in earnest to serve as deterrence. There is also an urgent need for deposit
insurance. This would not only protect clients when the MFIs collapse but also the strict conditions
attached to insurance would make MFIs’ operators become provident in their operations since
insurance companies are unlikely to pay for their unconsidered recklessness.

26

BoG turns down appeal of DKM microfinance customers: http://citifmonline.com/2015/06/02/bog-turns-downappeal-of-dkmmicrofinance-customers/#sthash.gN43e8PI.dpuf
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Conclusion
The study was instigated by the 2013 mammoth collapse of profit – accumulating
commercial MFIs in Ghana. The causal factors were grouped into internal and external factors.
Even though the context of the collapse involved external influences like collapse rumuors and
macroeconomic factors, the loci of the collapse were internal to the MFIs and manifested as
indiscriminate branching, offering of unsustainable packages, disregard of due diligence,
mismanagement and violation of the BoG’s rules and guidelines.
The unduly risky manner in which operators of MFIs (mis)apply investors and customers’
funds brings into question their moral responsibility to be cautious with poor people’s money and
this explains the growing public distrust for MFIs in Ghana. The MFIs themselves have recognized
the aversion of the public to their operations. However, going forward, to trust that, that in itself
or alone would bring providence in their operations would be a very expensive optimism. The
monitoring challenges of the Bank of Ghana is seriously noted but the evidence points to more
compliance and ethical operations when MFIs tails are tightly held to do so.
Accordingly, we recommend a two-pronged strategy to tackle the issue of collapsing MFIs
and its attendant problems in Ghana. The first strategy is risk-averting/reduction oriented and
includes progressive decentralization of the Other Financial Institution Supervision Department
(OFISD) of the Bank of Ghana and legal empowerment of the MFIs associations to peer-regulate
alongside the BoG. This would help to timely and in advance identify and prevent unethical and
illegal operations everywhere in Ghana as well as promote peer learning and knowledge sharing.
The second strategy is oriented towards protecting MFIs clients and the public from unscrupulous
people and financial institutions. This includes introduction of deposit insurance; intensification
of financial literacy campaign; tracking reports and rumuors on MFIs collapse–whether licensed
or unlicensed, to audit them and liquidate their assets to pay off depositors as well as criminal
prosecution of unscrupulous people who recklessly apply microfinance clients and investors funds
on unduly risky ventures.
Authors’ note: This is a shortened version of a thesis report. See the full version, appendices and
other related documents here: http://rudar.ruc.dk/handle/1800/23859
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